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INTRODUCTION
A fundamental tenet of tort law is that plaintiffs bear the burden to
prove their claims by a preponderance of the evidence. This burden
includes the requirement to prove that a defendant’s misconduct more
likely than not caused the plaintiff’s alleged injuries.1 In Burchfield v.
Wright, 2 the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal cast this seemingly
settled legal principle into doubt, until the Louisiana Supreme Court
reversed the decision.3 In Burchfield, the Second Circuit awarded full
medical malpractice damages despite the fact that the plaintiff could not
prove that the defendant’s negligence caused a traditional tort injury, but
only that it caused a loss of a less-than-50% chance of a better outcome.4
A recent student Comment (the “Morgan Comment” or “Morgan
Proposal”)5 expressed support for the Second Circuit’s approach and
called for legislative reform of this area.
In this rejoinder, written from the perspective of two defense
practitioners, we argue that the Morgan Proposal is flawed because it
would significantly relax the plaintiff’s burden to prove causation,
allowing plaintiffs to recover full or near-full medical malpractice
damages, including special damages, potentially far in excess of the
$500,000 cap, even when a plaintiff cannot prove causation of a traditional
injury. We argue that the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled correctly in
Burchfield v. Wright. Finally, we agree with the Morgan Proposal that the
time has come for legislative clarification of the lost chance cause of
action, but we propose a very different legislative fix. We believe it should
1. See Lasha v. Olin Corp., 625 So. 2d 1002, 1005 (La. 1993) (citing Jordan
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 245 So. 2d 151 (La. 1971); WILLIAM L. PROSSER & PAGE
KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 41 (5th ed. 1984); 2 CHARLES
TILFORD MCCORMICK & KENNETH S. BROUN, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 339
(4th ed. 1992); 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2497, 2498 (3d ed.
1940)).
2. Burchfield v. Wright, 224 So. 3d 1170 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2017), rev’d,
275 So. 3d 855 (La. 2018).
3. Burchfield v. Wright, 275 So. 3d 855 (La. 2018).
4. This Article refers to the doctrine as the “lost chance doctrine.” This
concept is also known as the “loss of a chance of survival” or “loss of a chance of
a better result.”
5. Madeleine K. Morgan, Comment, Revitalizing Louisiana’s Lost Chance
Doctrine: Burchfield v. Wright Sheds Light on the Need for Medical Expenses,
80 LA. L. REV. 487 (2020).
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involve establishing clear requirements regarding the narrow
circumstances in which the lost chance doctrine may be applied, and
overturning Smith v. State by adopting a percentage probability approach
for the calculation of damages.
Part I of this Article outlines the fundamental fairness problems with
the lost chance doctrine as it exists today, illustrating why attempts to
expand the doctrine should be met with skepticism. Part II responds to the
Morgan Proposal. Part III proposes alternative compromises for reforming
the lost chance doctrine.
I. PRACTICAL SHORTCOMINGS OF THE LOST CHANCE DOCTRINE
The Morgan Comment provides an exhaustive summary of the origins
and rationale underpinning the lost chance doctrine,6 which we will
address only briefly. The Louisiana Supreme Court first recognized the
lost chance doctrine in Hastings v. Baton Rouge General Hospital.7 It is a
judicially created legal theory intended to remedy the perceived unfairness
that occurs when a medical malpractice plaintiff can prove negligence on
the part of a healthcare provider, but the plaintiff struggles to prove
causation by a preponderance of the evidence, that is, a more-likely-thannot standard.8 In a typical lost chance case, the finder of fact is unable to
conclude that the improperly withheld treatment would have made a
difference—either because the treatment, although medically indicated, is
not particularly effective, or because the patient was in such bad shape
before the negligence occurred that the probability of recovery was lessthan-even in any scenario.
The doctrine represents an attempted compromise, established to
provide partial compensation to medical malpractice plaintiffs with
difficult causation cases who would otherwise recover nothing.9 As crafted
6. Id. at 492–513.
7. Hastings v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 498 So. 2d 713 (La. 1986).
8. Id. at 721 (“Requiring [defendant’s] survivors to prove that surgery would
have saved him would be an unreasonable burden.”).
9. Smith v. State Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 547 (La. 1996)
(“To allow full recovery would ignore the claimants’ inability to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the malpractice victim would have survived
but for the malpractice, which is a requirement for full recovery.”); Niang v.
Dryades YMCA Sch. of Com., Inc., 286 So. 3d 506, 507 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
2019) (declining to apply lost chance outside the medical malpractice context);
Lawrence W. Kessler, Alternative Liability in Litigation Malpractice Actions:
Eradicating the Last Resort of Scoundrels, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 401, 481 (2000)
(“Loss of chance is a compromise.”).
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by the Louisiana Supreme Court, the doctrine is explicitly not intended to
“make a plaintiff whole.”10 In lost chance cases, a plaintiff can recover, at
most, $500,000 plus judicial interest and costs, the amount of the cap on
damages under the Medical Malpractice Act.11 In this regard, lost chance
cases differ from traditional medical malpractice cases, in which a
plaintiff’s general damages are subject to the cap, but medical expenses
are not.12 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that less-than-full
damages are appropriate in a lost chance case, since the plaintiff is unable
to prove that the defendant’s conduct more likely than not caused her
injury.13 Further, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the lost chance
doctrine does not represent a relaxation of the typical burden of proof—
rather, it calls for a lesser award in light of the lesser injury that the plaintiff
could prove.14
The doctrine is best illustrated by way of example: in the case of
Coody v. Barraza, the patient had been in remission for ovarian cancer.15
The patient’s cancer recurred, but allegedly it was not diagnosed until
seven months later than it should have been.16 The patient died and was
survived by three children and a husband of 47 years.17 Under a traditional
wrongful death theory, the Coody plaintiff would face a significant
causation hurdle, as the testimony suggested that even with timely
diagnosis, only about 10% of recurrent ovarian cancer patients achieve a
second remission.18 But the Coody plaintiffs asserted a lost chance theory,
arguing that, even if the chance of a second remission was small, being
deprived of that chance was an injury unto itself.19 The jury agreed and
awarded $250,000, less than a typical wrongful death award, representing
the jury’s determination of how much that chance was worth; the court of
appeal affirmed.20
While Coody paints a relatively clean theoretical framework, in
practice the lost chance doctrine often unfolds in haphazard fashion,
creating fundamental fairness issues for the litigants. Common issues,
10. Smith, 676 So. 2d at 547.
11. LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1231.2(B)(1) (2020); Burchfield v. Wright, 275 So.
3d 855, 868 (La. 2018).
12. Id. § 40:1231.2(B)(1); id. § 40:1231.3(D).
13. Smith, 676 So. 2d at 547.
14. Id.
15. Coody v. Barraza, 111 So. 3d 485, 493 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2013).
16. Id. at 488–89.
17. Id. at 493.
18. Id. at 491–92.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 488.
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which remain unresolved or muddled by the jurisprudence, include: How
do courts of appeal determine whether a lost chance award is excessive?
When must a plaintiff assert the lost chance doctrine? And what evidence
must a plaintiff submit to warrant a lost chance interrogatory on the verdict
form?
Although the Morgan Comment suggests that lost chance is well
accepted and urges expansion of the doctrine, we note that the obvious,
fundamental fairness issues presented by the lost chance doctrine have
caused approximately half of states, along with Canada and the United
Kingdom, to reject the doctrine.21 The below discussion of these issues
illustrates why any attempts to expand the doctrine should be met with
caution.
A. It is Often Impossible for Courts of Appeal to Determine Whether a
Lost Chance Award Is Excessive under the Current Scheme
The first shortcoming of the lost chance doctrine is that it carries a
significant risk of jury confusion, often resulting in substantial jury awards
that are nearly immune from appellate review.22 Review is difficult
because juries are not required to specify their factual findings regarding
the degree of lost chance that the defendant’s conduct caused. Consider
the example of Braud v. Woodland Village L.L.C., where a nursing home
resident suffered a heart attack, which was not caused by the fault of any
defendant and which likely would have been fatal under any
circumstances.23 In pursuing a claim for malpractice, the plaintiff alleged
that the nursing home attendants had a duty to administer CPR but failed
to do so, and the patient died.24 A jury found loss of a chance and awarded
$1.65 million.25 Perhaps such an award would be reasonable if the jury
made a factual finding that the patient would have had a 40 to 50% chance
of survival if the defendant administered CPR.26 On the other hand, if the
21. See infra Section I.D.
22. See Stroud v. Golson, 744 So. 2d 1286 (La. 1999) (Victory, J.,
dissenting).
23. Braud v. Woodland Vill. L.L.C., 54 So. 3d 745 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
2010).
24. Id. at 748–49.
25. Id. at 749.
26. This jury confusion was partially attributable to the trial court’s decision
to give jury verdict interrogatories only on the issue of wrongful death, and not
lost chance, despite the apparent lack of any evidence supporting causation for
wrongful death—one of many examples illustrating that even the courts struggle
to apply the lost chance doctrine in a fair and consistent manner. Id. at 752.
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jury concluded that administering CPR would have provided a 5 to 10%
chance of survival, which is likely closer to reality,27 then the $1.65 million
would seemingly be excessive. Unfortunately, the courts of appeal are not
equipped to perform such an exercise, because juries are not required to
quantify the chance that is lost.
This lack of clarity is traceable directly to the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s opinion in Smith v. State, wherein the Court created a valuation
model for lost chance cases in Louisiana.28 The Smith Court rejected the
“percentage probability” model, whereby the award would be based upon
the jury’s determination of the percentage of the probability by which the
defendant’s conduct diminished the likelihood of achieving a more
favorable outcome.29 In other words, using the example of the nursing
home patient discussed above: if the patient’s typical wrongful death
damages would be $1.65 million, and the jury found the failure to
administer CPR deprived her of a 10% chance of survival, that would
result in a $165,000 award—arguably a reasonable result given the small
chance of survival. The Smith Court rejected this model as inviting too
much “uncertainty,” and instead embraced a “lump sum” valuation
model.30
Critics of the Smith Court’s “lump sum” approach, including former
Justice Victory, claimed that it is a “rabbit-out-of-the-hat” exercise.31
These critics point to the vague, holistic standards governing the
doctrine—juries are asked to assign a value to the lost chance, “in and of
itself,” and such value is to be “based on all of the relevant evidence in the
record, as is done for any other measurement of general damages.”32
Further, the jury “will be allowed to consider an abundance of evidence
and factors, including evidence of percentages of chance of survival along
27. See Richard A. Field et al., Systematic Review of Interventions to Improve
Appropriate Use and Outcomes Associated with Do-Not-AttemptCardiopulmonary-Resuscitation Decisions, 85 RESUSCITATION 1418 (2014),
available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resuscitation.2014.08.024 [https://perma.cc
/B8QD-6A68] (“Survival to hospital discharge rates [for patients receiving CPR]
are less than 20% for in-hospital arrests and less than 10% for out of hospital
cardiac arrest.”); Donald D. Tresch et al., Outcomes of Cardiopulmonary
Resuscitation in Nursing Homes: Can We Predict Who Will Benefit?, 95 AM. J.
MED. 123 (1993), available at https://doi.org/10.1016/0002-9343(93)90252-k
[https://perma.cc/66BC-G7MQ] (5% of nursing home patients receiving CPR
survived to be discharged from hospital).
28. Smith v. State Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543 (La. 1996).
29. Id. at 548.
30. Id. at 548–50.
31. Id. at 551.
32. Id. at 549.
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with evidence such as loss of support and loss of love and affection, and
any other evidence bearing on the value of the lost chance.”33 These openended standards amount to little more than telling the jury “you write down
whatever number feels right to you”—and it is not surprising that juries
often respond with substantial numbers, approximating or even exceeding
wrongful death awards, in an effort to compensate injured, sympathetic
plaintiffs.34
When the Smith Court predicted that courts of appeal would be
capable of reviewing these awards based on the record before them, the
Court failed to acknowledge that the record often contains conflicting
testimony from opposing experts on the percentage chances of the lost
chance. It is the jury’s duty to decide which position is more credible. In
many other lost chance cases, there is no evidence presented on the
percentage probability of survival at all. For example, in delayed treatment
cases, we routinely hear plaintiff experts, when asked about the chance of
survival, testify: “I can’t put a number on it, but earlier treatment is always
better.” Such testimony can lead a jury to reach a wide range of
conclusions—but because they are not required to make an actual finding
on the percentage probability, it is nearly impossible for the court of appeal
to determine what the jury accepted as the amount of chance deprived, and
whether the jury’s award was excessive or not.
Appellate review of lost chance awards is crucial, as jury confusion is
a significant risk with the Smith Court’s “lump sum” approach.35 In Stroud,
Justice Victory dissented from the Court’s denial of writs and urged the
Court to reconsider the “lump sum” approach.36 The Stroud jury had
awarded $1.5 million in lost chance damages, despite the plaintiff’s own
expert testifying that the plaintiff was deprived of, at most, a 20% chance
33. Id.
34. See also Jury Verdict Form at 3, Doyle v. La. Med. Mut. Ins. Co., 2018
WL 6927616 (La. Dist. Ct. May 24, 2018) (award of $500,000 despite finding
that plaintiff suffered a loss of a 30% chance of survival); Burchfield v. Wright,
275 So. 3d 855, 859 (La. 2018) (lump sum of $680,000); Jury Verdict Form at 1,
Norwood v. Medina, 2008 WL 5868763 (La. Dist. Ct. Jan. 8, 2008) (lump sum of
$500,000); Verdict and Settlement Summary at 1, Anderson v. LaSalle Gen.
Hosp., 2006 WL 3873282 (La. 24th Dist. Ct. June 27, 2006) (lump sum of
$600,000); Hargroder v. Unkel, 888 So. 2d 953 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2004) (found
that jury improperly awarded damages for stroke victim’s full injury and
complications, as opposed to just compensating for the lost chance of a better
result); Lewis v. State Med. Ctr. of La., 983 So. 2d 231, 238 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
2008), cert. denied sub nom, 989 So. 2d 105 (La. 2008) (lump sum of
$1,834,914.31).
35. See Stroud v. Golson, 744 So. 2d 1286 (La. 1999).
36. Id.
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of survival.37 Justice Victory analyzed recent wrongful death awards and
concluded that $1 million would be a typical award at that time for full
wrongful death damages.38 That a jury awarded a significantly greater
amount, when lost chance awards were supposed to be less than full
wrongful death awards, led Justice Victory to view the case as “a glaring
example of why the majority’s opinion in Smith does not work and why
the percentage probability test should be adopted by this court.”39 The
Stroud case is but one of many examples demonstrating that juries often
award a “lump sum” amount that exceeds the medical malpractice cap of
$500,000.40 Excessive lost chance awards are even more concerning to
non-qualified healthcare providers, whose damages awards are not subject
to the cap.
The recognized propensity for jury confusion and the absence of
effective appellate review weigh against any attempt to expand the lost
chance doctrine.
B. Plaintiffs Are Typically Allowed to Assert a Lost Chance Theory for
the First Time Very Late in the Litigation
Just as the lack of clear guidance on the lost chance doctrine results in
appellate confusion, it similarly results in trial confusion. Because there
are no hard rules, plaintiffs are often allowed to assert a lost chance theory
for the first time very late in the litigation, placing defendants in the
position of defending a claim that did not exist during the discovery phase.
In our experience, it is rare that a plaintiff raises a lost chance theory
in her medical review panel complaint (the initial pleading in medical
malpractice cases, which must be presented to a medical review panel
before they can be asserted in court). Rather, the much more common
scenario is that a medical malpractice plaintiff asserts a traditional injury
claim, such as wrongful death, to the medical review panel, and after the
panel renders an opinion, she files a post-panel petition in court that again
asserts a traditional injury claim. As discovery unfolds, and after the
plaintiff retains an expert, at some point the plaintiff realizes that her
wrongful death claim might actually be a lost chance claim, that is,
because the plaintiff realizes she has a causation problem. When a plaintiff
raises the lost chance theory multiple years after the initial medical review
panel complaint, either through an amended petition or less formal means,
what remedies does a defendant have?
37.
38.
39.
40.
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This remained an open question until 2016, when the Supreme Court
ruled in Bailey v. Knatt. In that case, the patient underwent a hip
replacement in 2010 that resulted in complications.41 The plaintiff filed a
panel complaint in 2011 alleging a traditional medical malpractice
claim—namely, that the healthcare providers caused her injuries. In 2013,
a medical review panel rendered an opinion in favor of the defendants. In
2014, the plaintiff filed a post-panel petition in court, again alleging a
traditional medical malpractice claim. On July 14, 2015, more than four
years from the last date of any alleged malpractice, the plaintiff amended
her petition to assert a lost chance claim—that is, that the defendants’
negligence deprived her of a chance of a better outcome.
The Bailey defendants responded to the amended petition with an
exception of prescription, arguing that the lost chance claim constituted a
new cause of action that was premature, as it was never presented to a
medical review panel,42 and for which prescription was never interrupted,
making it untimely.43 The trial court granted the exception and dismissed
the lost chance claim. After the First Circuit denied writs, the Supreme
Court granted writs and reversed, providing this brief opinion:
Granted. Plaintiff’s claim based on the loss of the chance of a
better outcome is a theory of recovery arising from the same
transaction or occurrence as her other claims and is not a separate
cause of action. See Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru
South, Inc., 616 So.2d 1234 (La. 1993).44 Accordingly, the
41. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 3, Bailey v. Knatt, 207 So. 3d 407 (La.
2016) (No. 2016-CC-1130).
42. The MMA requires, “All malpractice claims against health care
providers . . . shall be reviewed by a medical review panel . . . .” LA. REV. STAT.
§ 40:1231.8 (2020). When a plaintiff asserts a malpractice claim in court without
first submitting that claim to a medical review panel, a defendant’s remedy is to
seek dismissal by way of a dilatory exception of prematurity. LA. CODE CIV.
PROC. art. 926(A)(1) (2010).
43. The prescriptive period for a medical malpractice claim may only be
interrupted by timely filing a request for a medical review panel. A plaintiff’s
assertion of a medical malpractice claim in a district court, without having
submitted that claim to a medical review panel, does not interrupt prescription.
Bush v. Nat’l Health Care of Leesville, 939 So. 2d 1216 (La. 2006); LeBreton v.
Rabito, 714 So. 2d 1226 (La. 1998).
44. See Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru S., Inc., 616 So. 2d
1234, 1238–39 (La. 1993) (“There is only one cause of action (although several
demands or theories of recovery may be asserted thereon) when the operative facts
of one transaction or occurrence give rise to the plaintiff’s right to assert the action
against the defendant.”).
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judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case remanded
for further proceedings.45
After Bailey, it is not clear that a defendant has any basis for objecting
that a lost chance claim was “added too late.” Bailey certainly undercuts
any argument that a lost chance claim should have been part of the
plaintiff’s original medical review panel complaint, seemingly doing away
with any basis for filing exceptions of prematurity or prescription on those
grounds.
So when is the latest a plaintiff may assert a lost chance theory?
According to at least one recent appellate decision, the answer may be as
late as the jury charge conference.46
The Matranga case47 involved an 80-year-old female who was
admitted for a heart surgery to provide a new aortic heart valve, which
required intubation for anesthesia.48 Shortly after intubation, she suffered
a bleed in her right lung, experienced a cardiac arrest, and her brain was
deprived of oxygen.49 By the time she was successfully ventilated, her
brain had been deprived of oxygen for long enough to cause significant
brain damage, and she died shortly later.50
At all times during the litigation, the Matranga plaintiffs pleaded only
wrongful death theories of recovery, not lost chance.51 Likewise, at trial,
the plaintiffs presented only wrongful death evidence.52 However, at the
jury charge conference, plaintiffs requested jury charges regarding lost
chance.53 The trial judge declined to include lost chance on the verdict
form or jury instructions due to the lack of lost chance evidence introduced
during trial.54 The jury returned a verdict in favor of all defendants, finding
no breach in the standard of care.55

45. Bailey v. Knatt, 207 So. 3d 407 (La. 2016).
46. See Matranga v. Par. Anesthesia of Jefferson, LLC, 170 So. 3d 1077 (La.
Ct. App. 5th Cir.), cert. denied, 178 So. 3d 148 (La. 2015), and cert. denied, 178
So. 3d 152 (La. 2015).
47. Our law firm represented one of the Matranga defendants at trial and on
appeal. Id.
48. Id. at 1082–84.
49. Id. at 1083.
50. Id. at 1084.
51. Id. at 1095.
52. Brief of Defendant-Appellees at 2, 6–8, Matranga v. Par. Anesthesia of
Jefferson, LLC, 170 So. 3d 1077 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2015) (No. 14–CA–448).
53. Matranga, 170 So. 3d at 1094–96.
54. Id. at 1095–96.
55. Id. at 1089.
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On appeal, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit held that the trial court’s failure
to instruct the jury on lost chance was reversible error and remanded the
case for a new trial.56 The language of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in
Matranga is sweeping, and presents a host of alarming implications for
lost chance defendants, discussed further below. But first and foremost,
Matranga seems to support the notion that plaintiffs can assert a lost
chance theory for the first time at virtually any stage of the litigation,
including just before the case is submitted to the jury. This presents a high
risk of prejudice to defendants, which would be exacerbated by expansion
of the lost chance doctrine.
C. A Lost Chance Claim Can Potentially Be Submitted to Jury Even If
Only Wrongful Death Evidence Is Presented at Trial
To a defense practitioner, the most troubling aspect of the Matranga
decision is the idea that plaintiffs may be allowed to ask a jury for a lost
chance award, as an alternative to wrongful death damages, even if they
submitted no lost chance evidence at trial, thereby depriving the defendant
of the opportunity to address and rebut that evidence. This is a strategy we
have encountered multiple times, and we refer to this theory colloquially
as medical malpractice’s “lesser included offense.”
The Matranga plaintiffs presented no evidence of a lost chance, and
did not raise the issue of lost chance at any point in the litigation until the
jury charge conference.57 The Matranga trial court found that the jury
should not be asked to award damages for lost chance, as there was no
evidence in the record to support this theory.58 In reversing the trial court,
the Fifth Circuit implied that in any wrongful death case, the judge must
instruct the jury as to the lost chance doctrine if requested, otherwise the
judge will have misinformed the jury as to the burden of proving causation
and thus committed reversible error—clearly running afoul of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Smith.59
56. Id. at 1098–99.
57. Brief of Defendant-Appellees, supra note 52, at 2, 6–8.
58. See Matranga, 170 So. 3d at 1094–96.
59. Smith v. State, Department of Health & Hospitals held:
Allowing recovery for the loss of a chance of survival is not, as the court
of appeal suggested, a change or a relaxation of the usual burden of proof
by a preponderance of the evidence. Rather, allowing such recovery is a
recognition of the loss of a chance of survival as a distinct compensable
injury caused by the defendant’s negligence, to be distinguished from the
loss of life in wrongful death cases, and there is no variance from the
usual burden in proving that distinct loss.
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The Matranga court explained that a lost chance jury charge was
necessary because:
Loss of chance of survival is a legal doctrine which governs [the
element of causation] of a medical malpractice action when the
alleged malpractice results in a patient’s death. Under Louisiana
law, a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action is not required to
prove that a healthcare provider directly caused their patient’s
death.60
In so holding, Matranga fails to acknowledge the distinctions between the
lost chance theory and the wrongful death theory, instead seemingly
treating them as one and the same. In attempting to avoid the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Smith, which drew a clear distinction between wrongful
death and lost chance claims, the Matranga court noted: “Smith does not
stand for the proposition that plaintiffs in a wrongful death or survival
action are prohibited from supporting their theory of recovery with regard
to causation using the loss of chance of survival doctrine.”61 This is a
misreading of Smith and an obvious conflation of two distinct legal
theories.
Despite the Smith Court’s seemingly clear guidance that a lost chance
claim addresses a distinct compensable harm, Matranga seems to imply
that lost chance jury instructions must be given in all medical malpractice
wrongful death actions. The Matranga court stated very matter-of-factly:
“loss of chance of survival was applicable in the case at bar because of the
plaintiffs’ claim that Ms. Greathouse died as a result the defendants’
alleged malpractice.”62 Even more perplexing, the Matranga court found
error only in the jury instructions’ failure to address lost chance, but not
with the verdict form itself, which included only interrogatories related to
wrongful death damages.63 This suggests that the Matranga court did not
see lost chance as a distinct injury subject to special verdict forms and a
unique method of valuation, such as one line for a lump sum award as
Smith called for, but rather as the standard of proof for causation in a
wrongful death claim. The Matranga court even recited, with seeming
approval, the plaintiff’s argument that “by excluding the instruction on

676 So. 2d 543, 547 (La. 1996).
60. Matranga, 170 So. 3d at 1094.
61. Id. at 1095.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 1094–96.
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loss of chance of survival, the trial court was holding the plaintiffs to an
improper standard of proof.”64
Matranga suggests that courts should allow plaintiffs to plead
traditional injury claims, such as wrongful death, and later re-define the
alleged injury when convenient. Matranga also suggests that plaintiffs
may seek traditional wrongful death damages, including medical expenses
in excess of the cap, but request that the jury be instructed that the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving only the loss of a chance of a better result.
Such a result would essentially be a relaxation of a plaintiff’s burden to
prove causation of wrongful death damages—which is exactly what the
Supreme Court warned against in Smith.65
While Matranga has not been overturned and will continue to muddy
the waters on these issues, there is reason to believe that the courts have
recognized that Matranga went too far. Just two years after Matranga, the
same Fifth Circuit panel appeared to walk back the implications of
Matranga in the case of Deykin v. Ochsner.66 Although Deykin did not
explicitly overrule Matranga, it upheld the trial court’s decision to not
provide jury charges or interrogatories regarding the loss of a chance of
survival, holding that:
not every malpractice claim involving death necessarily
implicates the loss of a chance of survival doctrine, or necessitates
the giving of a loss of a chance of survival instruction. Only in
malpractice cases involving death where the evidence presented
indicates that the loss of a chance of survival doctrine is applicable
is it appropriate to give such an instruction.67
In other words, a plaintiff must present evidence to justify a lost
chance instruction. If that remains the law, Matranga will prove to be an
anomaly, and courts will prohibit plaintiffs from using lost chance jury
instructions to confuse juries about the burden of proof in traditional
wrongful death cases. Still, Matranga and Deykin serve as clear evidence
that even the courts struggle to conceptualize lost chance and to apply it in
a fair and consistent manner,68 which should raise further concerns over
any efforts to expand the doctrine.
64. Id. at 1095 n.19.
65. Smith v. State, Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 547 (La. 1996).
66. See Deykin v. Ochsner Clinic Found., 219 So. 3d 1234, 1240 (La. Ct.
App. 5th Cir. 2017).
67. Id.
68. As originally crafted by the Smith Court, the lost chance doctrine was
intended to address causation problems in wrongful death cases. 676 So. 2d at
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D. Many Jurisdictions Have Rejected the Lost Chance Doctrine
Altogether
It is for these reasons, and others, that fewer than half of the states
have adopted the lost chance doctrine, with many jurisdictions explicitly
rejecting it. Specifically, 24 states have adopted some version of the lost
chance doctrine, 17 have rejected it, 4 have deferred ruling on the doctrine,
and 5 have yet to address the matter.69 Further, the lost chance doctrine has
been met with hostility by the Supreme Court of Canada and by courts in
the United Kingdom.70
The rationales from these jurisdictions should also be considered
during any discussion of expanding the doctrine in Louisiana. Common
criticisms from courts rejecting the lost chance doctrine are that it
represents a relaxation of the normal burden of proof,71 and that it
548–49. Over the years, the doctrine was expanded such that it applied not only
to death cases, but to any medical malpractice claim in which a plaintiff alleged
the loss of a chance of a “better outcome.” See, e.g., Hargroder v. Unkel, 888 So.
2d 953, 956 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2004) (plaintiff alleged that failure to diagnose
a stroke caused continued weakness and necessitated early retirement). The
judiciary’s broadening of the lost chance doctrine represents even further erosion
of traditional burden of proof and causation standards, and further illustrates the
need for the legislature to address the issue.
69. Lauren Guest et al., The “Loss of Chance” Rule as a Special Category of
Damages in Medical Malpractice: A State-by-State Analysis, 21 J. LEGAL ECON.
53, 55 (2015).
70. See Nayha Acharya, No More Chances for Lost Chances: A Weinribian
Response to Weinrib, 12 MCGILL J. L. & HEALTH 205 (2019); Harold Luntz, Loss
of Chance in Medical Negligence, 522 U. MELB. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER NO.
522 at 22 (2011), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=1743862 [https://perma.cc/P7WB-XEBD] (discussing Laferriére v. Lawson,
[1991] 1 S.C.R. 541 (Can.); Hotson v. E. Berkshire Health Auth., [1987] AC 750
(HL), [1987] 2 All ER 909 (UK); Gregg v. Scott, [2005] 2 AC 176 (HL), [2005]
4 All ER 812 (UK)).
71. See, e.g., Fennell v. S. Md. Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 213 (Md.
1990). The court reasoned:
Re-defining loss of chance of survival as a new form of damages so that
the compensable injury is not the death, but is the loss of chance of
survival itself, may really be an exercise in semantics. Loss of chance of
survival in itself is not compensable unless and until death ensues. Thus,
it would seem that the true injury is the death. While we should not award
damages if there is no injury, the logical extension of the loss of chance
damages theory arguably should allow loss of chance damages for
negligence, even when the patient miraculously recovers.
Id.

352182-LSU_81-3_Text.indd 204

4/26/21 8:53 AM

2021]

PROPERLY LIMITING THE LOST CHANCE DOCTRINE

877

represents a drastic shift in tort liability that would be best left up to state
legislatures.72 The Supreme Court of Texas has further noted the risk of
creating a slippery slope—if lost chance can be applied in the medical
malpractice context, why should it not apply to a legal malpractice
plaintiff’s claim of a lost chance of victory at trial due to poor lawyering,
or perhaps an entrepreneur’s lost chance of success for a new failed
business due to the actions of another?73 In rejecting the doctrine, the
Supreme Court of Texas concluded: “We see nothing unique about the
healing arts which should make its practitioners more responsible for
possible but not probable consequences than any other negligent actor.”74
Louisiana courts have thus far refused to apply lost chance outside of
the medical malpractice context, even in cases that seem analogous. In
Niang v. Dryades YMCA School of Commerce, Inc., Mr. Niang collapsed
while playing basketball at the YMCA.75 His wife was present and
requested an automated external defibrillator (AED).76 YMCA staff
informed her that an AED was not available.77 Mr. Niang was hospitalized
and died shortly later.78 His wife filed suit against the YMCA, alleging a
violation of statutory duty to keep an AED on the premises.79 Her petition
specifically asserted both a traditional wrongful death claim, as well as a
loss of a chance of survival claim.80

72. See, e.g., Dumas v. Cooney, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1593, 1608, 1611 (Ct. App.
1991). The court explained:
[D]isagreement on such weighty matters of public policy militates
against judicial tampering with the long-standing meaning of causation
in deference to legislative consideration of the issue. . . .The debate on
lost chance is vigorous, and we favor the established rule of tort
causation. More fundamentally, however, we believe that “[s]weeping
modifications of tort liability law fall more suitably within the domain
of the Legislature, before which all affected interests can be heard and
which can enact statutes providing uniform standards and guidelines for
the future.
Id.
73. See Kramer v. Lewisville Mem’l. Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 406 (Tex.
1993).
74. Id.
75. Niang v. Dryades YMCA Sch. of Com., Inc., 286 So. 3d 506, 508 (La.
Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2019).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1137.3 (2020).
80. Niang, 286 So. 3d at 508.
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The Niang defendant sought dismissal of the lost chance claim,
arguing that Louisiana law limited the doctrine to medical malpractice
actions.81 The trial court agreed and dismissed the claim.82 The court of
appeal affirmed, holding that, outside of the medical context, it is overly
speculative to determine whether a plaintiff was deprived of a chance of
survival; on the other hand, “the loss of chance as a result of medical
treatment has a definitive value and is not speculative.”83
From a logical perspective, the Niang claim seems indistinguishable
from the claims in Hastings and Smith. If the loss of a chance truly
represents a “distinct compensable injury”84 holding a value in and of
itself, then why should that injury not be compensable in a general
negligence context? If it is too speculative to determine whether a plaintiff
would have possessed a chance of survival if provided access to an AED,
it would seemingly also be too speculative in other medical malpractice
contexts, such as the failure to administer CPR.85
Niang confirms that the lost chance theory does not naturally follow
from our fundamental notions of tort liability, but is rather a judicially
created compromise that the courts apply in a narrow legal context. Further
expansion of the lost chance doctrine would make Louisiana an outlier,
which warrants further skepticism of such efforts.
II. CRITIQUE OF THE MORGAN PROPOSAL
Having established that the lost chance doctrine presents fundamental
fairness concerns even in its current form, we turn now to the Morgan
Comment, which proposes expansion of the doctrine. Specifically, the
Morgan Comment proposes that juries finding a loss of chance shall award
two categories of damages: first, a “lump sum” similar to the Smith
approach which would be subject to the $500,000 cap, and would account
for the plaintiff’s pain and suffering, emotional distress, disability and
disfigurement, and loss of consortium, but not medical expenses; and
second, an award for the full amount of plaintiff’s medical expenses, not
discounted for the failure to prove injury by a preponderance, and not
subject to the cap.
This proposal, while well intentioned, is significantly flawed, as it
would establish a relaxed burden on causation, would create an
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
2010).
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unworkable framework for determining which medical expenses are
recoverable, and would be inconsistent with the original purpose of the
Supreme Court in adopting the lost chance doctrine, which is explicitly not
intended to “make a plaintiff whole.”
A. The Morgan Proposal Would Establish a Significantly Relaxed
Burden on Causation
The Morgan Proposal would award plaintiffs with full or near full
medical malpractice damages despite their inability to prove a traditional
injury. As already set forth above, juries routinely award lost chance “lump
sum” awards exceeding the $500,000 cap.86 To allow plaintiffs to recover
a lump sum of that size, plus full medical expenses, would result in lost
chance plaintiffs receiving the same or nearly the same level of
compensation as traditional medical malpractice plaintiffs who are able to
prove their injuries by a preponderance of the evidence. Awarding full
damages to lost chance plaintiffs is exactly what the Supreme Court
forbade in Smith, because “[t]o allow full recovery would ignore the
claimants’ inability to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
malpractice victim would have survived but for the malpractice.”87
This would essentially result in a relaxation of the burden of proof.
Under the Morgan Proposal, it is difficult to imagine why plaintiff
attorneys would ever assert a traditional wrongful death claim or other
injury requiring proof of causation greater than 50%, when they could
instead assert a lost chance claim, for which they must prove only a chance
of a better result and still receive full or near full damages. This would be
especially true in cases involving substantial medical expenses, which is
what drives the value of medical malpractice cases in light of the $500,000
cap. Thus, the Morgan Proposal cannot be squared with the Supreme
Court’s recognition in Smith that a relaxation of the burden of proof would
violate basic tenets of Louisiana tort law.88 This point has been emphasized
not just by the courts, but also by academics. Professors Maraist and
Galligan summarized the issue well when they observed:
To allow full recovery would do violence to the “redefinition of
injury” theory. It is one thing to say a wrongdoer who destroys the
victim’s chance to survive, no matter how slight, must pay
damages equaling the value of the lost chance of survival, and
quite another to say that he must pay the full amount of the
86. See sources cited supra note 34.
87. Smith, 676 So. 2d at 547.
88. See id.
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wrongful death damages. The lost chance of survival theory is a
sound one, but the damages should be fixed at the value of the
chance.89
B. The Morgan Proposal Would Create an Unworkable Framework for
Determining Which Medical Expenses Are Recoverable
Next, the Morgan Proposal is flawed as it would create an unworkable
framework for determining which medical expenses are recoverable. The
lost chance doctrine often arises in the context of patients with significant
pre-existing conditions,90 or who suffer a serious injury not caused by the
defendant’s conduct.91 The Morgan Proposal calls for juries to award
medical expenses, but it creates a significant risk that juries will
compensate plaintiffs for medical expenses that have nothing to do with
the defendant’s conduct.
For example, in Burchfield v. Wright, the plaintiff suffered from
numerous pre-existing conditions, “including congestive heart failure,
hypertension, and at least two, but possibly four, prior heart attacks.”92 Mr.
Burchfield suffered another heart attack, and eventually required a heart
transplant.93 The jury found that the plaintiff failed to prove that the
defendant’s conduct more likely than not caused Mr. Burchfield’s heart
attack or any of his subsequent complications.94 But the plaintiff argued,
and the jury apparently accepted, that if not for the defendant’s negligence,
the plaintiff would have had a less-than-50% chance of being a candidate
for a heart bypass surgery, as opposed to the transplant.95
In support of damages, the plaintiff offered evidence of medical
expenses not only related to the transplant surgery itself but also evidence
89. FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, JR., LOUISIANA TORT LAW
§ 4.04 (2010); see also William R. Corbett, What Is Troubling About the
Tortification of Employment Discrimination Law?, 75 OHIO ST. L. J. 1027, 1073
(2014) (opining that the notion of lost chance as a distinct compensable harm, as
opposed to a different standard of causation, is of “debatable” merit and
persuasiveness).
90. See, e.g., Burchfield v. Wright, 275 So. 3d 855, 861 (La. 2018) (plaintiff
suffered from pre-existing conditions, “including congestive heart failure,
hypertension, and two, but possibly four, prior heart attacks”).
91. Braud v. Woodland Vill. LLC, 54 So. 3d 745, 752 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 60 So. 3d 1254 (La. 2011) (both sides’ experts agreed that the
patient would have suffered a heart attack regardless of the defendant’s conduct).
92. Burchfield, 275 So. 3d at 861.
93. Id. at 858.
94. Id. at 859.
95. Id.
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that “Mr. Burchfield would require future medical care for the rest of his
life.”96 Of course, given his serious pre-existing heart disease, Mr.
Burchfield almost certainly would have required extensive cardiology care
regardless of any negligence by the defendants. Under the Morgan
Proposal, defendants would face the risk of being burdened with
compensating a plaintiff for the costs of all future medical care in any way
related to the condition at issue, even if the plaintiff has not proven
causation of any concrete injury, and even if the plaintiff would have
sustained many of those costs in the absence of any negligence by the
defendant. The Morgan Comment acknowledges this danger, and
professes to provide a solution: “The court would carefully instruct the
jury to award only medical expenses that a plaintiff incurred as a result of
the physician’s negligence. Essentially, the jury will use its discretion to
isolate the medical expenses that resulted from the defendant’s breach and
only award medical expenses in that amount.”97
But how could a jury possibly determine which expenses were “a
result of,” that is, were caused by, a defendant’s negligence if they have
already concluded that the plaintiff cannot prove traditional causation?
Moreover, some courts do not require a plaintiff to proffer evidence
tailored to the lost chance claim.98 The whole point of the lost chance
doctrine is to provide a remedy in cases that have very poor quality of
evidence on causation—and in the absence of such evidence, it is not
realistic to expect a jury to be able to isolate the relevant medical expenses
in the manner the Morgan Comment proposes.
This conundrum is even more difficult in pediatric cases, which are a
significant source of medical malpractice litigation. We have litigated
numerous cases involving babies who were unfortunately born with
serious physical or neurological complications, where the parents later
allege negligence in the treatment of these complications. Sadly, for many
babies born with severe complications, the full extent and nature of the
present-at-birth complications do not reveal themselves until the baby
develops into a toddler and beyond. Such cases present significant
exposure to defendants, as it is difficult to isolate the complications which
are arguably related to the allegedly negligent act from those which would
be expected in the absence of negligence. Under traditional “eggshell”
theories, defendants are liable for the full consequences of their conduct,
even if they merely aggravated a pre-existing condition.99
96. Id. at 861.
97. Morgan, supra note 5, at 532 (emphasis added).
98. See supra Section I.C, discussing the Matranga case.
99. See Aisole v. Dean, 574 So. 2d 1248, 1253 (La. 1991) (“It is a wellestablished principle of law that a tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him and
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When it comes to medical expenses that an “eggshell plaintiff” likely
would have incurred even in the absence of negligence, perhaps the risk
of over-burdening a defendant with such costs is a necessary evil in cases
in which the plaintiff can actually prove causation of a concrete injury. But
asking a jury to determine which future medical expenses, which may be
legion, shall be charged against the defendant—at full price—when the
plaintiff has not proven traditional causation would almost certainly result
in defendants being unfairly burdened with paying for damages they did
not cause.
C. The Morgan Proposal Is Based on the False Premise That the Lost
Chance Doctrine Is Intended to “Make Plaintiffs Whole”
Finally, the Morgan Proposal is flawed as it is based on the notion that
the lost chance doctrine is intended to “make plaintiffs whole”100—which
is false. In Smith, the Supreme Court confirmed that Louisiana adopted the
lost chance doctrine, which approximately half of the states have rejected,
in order to provide partial compensation to plaintiffs who would otherwise
recover nothing given their problems of proof.101 This is a judicially
created compromise. If the lost chance doctrine were truly a natural
offshoot of traditional tort theories, then one would expect to see it widely
embraced by the states and expanded to general negligence cases102—but
neither has happened.
The Morgan Comment argues that the legislature “intended” for full
medical expenses to be awarded to lost chance plaintiffs, and that “strict
construction” of the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) dictates such a
result.103 This argument is puzzling. The MMA is indeed supposed to be
strictly construed, and that is why many commentators object to the
judiciary’s creation of the lost chance doctrine in the first place, because
the legal basis for the lost chance doctrine is found nowhere in the
although the damages caused are greater because of the victims’ prior condition
which is aggravated by the tort, the tortfeasor is nevertheless responsible for the
consequences of his tort.”); Gaunt v. Progressive Sec. Ins. Co., 92 So. 3d 1250,
1271 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 So. 3d 33 (La. 2012), cert. denied,
102 So. 3d 37 (La. 2012) (“This concept is often referred to as the ‘eggshell’
plaintiff principle.”).
100. Morgan, supra note 5.
101. Smith v. State Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 547 (La. 1996).
102. See Kramer v. Lewisville Mem’l. Hosp., 858 S.W.2d 397, 406 (Tex.
1993) (“[I]t is doubtful that there is any principled way we could prevent [the lost
chance doctrine’s] application to similar actions involving other professions.”).
103. Morgan, supra note 5, at 527–28.
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MMA.104 Rather, the MMA provides that medical malpractice plaintiffs
have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that as a
proximate result of the defendant’s negligence “the plaintiff suffered
injuries that would not otherwise have been incurred.”105
Proponents of lost chance argue that the lost chance is an injury unto
itself, therefore fitting within the statutory language. But the courts’
refusal to apply this rationale outside of the medical malpractice context,
as recently re-affirmed in Niang v. YMCA,106 indicates that lost chance is
not naturally encompassed by definitions of a tort injury,107 but is instead
a judicially created compromise. Simply put, the MMA does not require
the application of the lost chance doctrine, and it certainly does not support
its expansion.
The Morgan Comment argues that the inevitable result of Burchfield
is that some injured plaintiffs will not be compensated for the full extent
of their medical expenses, even if they have proven negligence on the part
of a defendant. This is true, and it has always been true for plaintiffs
lacking proof of causation, as bedrock legal principles establish that
defendants shall not be charged with bearing the burden of compensating
victims in the absence of sufficient proof of causation.108 Allegedly
undercompensated lost chance plaintiffs will be placed in a similar
position as any other member of society with an unfortunate medical
ailment—namely, he or she requires medical treatment not because of
negligence but because of a medical condition. Under such circumstances,
the health insurance system must bear the cost of care.
III. PROPOSAL FOR REFORMING THE LOST CHANCE DOCTRINE
The Louisiana Supreme Court ruled correctly in Burchfield v. Wright,
as the Second Circuit’s decision effectively created a relaxed burden of
proof in violation of fundamental legal principles. Nevertheless, we agree
104. Smith, 676 So. 2d at 550 (Victory, J., dissenting) (citing LA. REV. STAT.
§ 9:2794(A)(3) (2020) as a basis for rejecting the lost chance doctrine).
105. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2794(A)(3) (2020).
106. Niang v. Dryades YMCA Sch. of Com., Inc., 286 So. 3d 506 (La. Ct.
App. 4th Cir. 2019).
107. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2315 (2020). This Article broadly calls for
compensating plaintiffs for “[e]very act whatever of man that causes damage to
another.” Id.
108. Lasha v. Olin Corp., 625 So. 2d 1002, 1005 (La. 1993) (citing Jordan v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 245 So. 2d 151 (La. 1971); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1,
§ 41; 2 MCCORMICK & BROUN, supra note 1, § 339; 9 WIGMORE, supra note 1,
§§ 2497, 2498).
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with the Morgan Comment that the legislature should address the lost
chance doctrine. We propose that the legislature first engage in an
appropriate debate about whether the doctrine belongs in Louisiana at all.
Assuming the lost chance doctrine is allowed to live on, the legislature
should charge plaintiffs with providing timely notice of lost chance claims,
and only allow lost chance to be submitted to a jury when warranted by
the evidence, eliminating the “lesser included offense” in medical
malpractice.
Likewise, we would encourage reform on the issue of how to value
the loss of a chance. As set forth above, we believe the “lump sum”
approach causes jury confusion and prevents appellate review of
seemingly excessive awards. We endorse a version of the percentage
probability approach that Professor Joseph H. King, Jr. proposed,109 but
Smith rejected.110 Under our proposal, a court would be charged with
reducing the total damages based on the percentage probability assigned
by the jury—for example, if the jury found damages of $1 million, but a
deprivation of only a 10% chance of a better result, the plaintiff would be
awarded $100,000.
Our proposal is superior to the “lump sum” approach because it
reduces the risk of jury confusion, it provides greater ability for appellate
review of damage awards, and it incentivizes plaintiffs to submit specific,
quality evidence on the amount of the lost chance, rather than presenting
the jury with vague, unhelpful testimony like “early treatment is better.”
Critics of percentage probability approaches, including the Smith Court,
argue that the approach invites too much “uncertainty,” and that plaintiffs
would be too easily prejudiced by juries who struggle with determining an
appropriate percentage.111 This argument gives juries too little credit and
fails to recognize that juries are routinely asked to determine percentages
in making comparative fault determinations. If juries can be trusted to
divide fault among numerous asbestos defendants, with findings within
the hundredths of a percent,112 then surely they are capable of weighing

109. Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury
Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L. J.
1353 (1981).
110. Smith v. State Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 676 So. 2d 543, 548–50 (La.
1996).
111. Id. at 548.
112. See Chaisson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 947 So. 2d 171, 179 (La. Ct. App.
4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 954 So. 2d 145 (La. 2007) (affirming jury’s finding
that six asbestos defendants’ fault could be broken down in amounts of 37.5%,
7.5%, 42.58%, 8.68%, .83%, and 2.91%).
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expert testimony and determining whether the patient’s chance of survival
was closer to 5% or 45%.
Our proposal includes the application of the MMA’s hard cap of
$500,000, in that it does not allow for an award of medical expenses in
excess of the cap. While this may be less generous than what is available
in traditional medical malpractice cases, this proposal is fair in light of the
fact that the plaintiff is unable to prove by a preponderance of evidence
that any medical expenses would have been incurred if not for the
defendant’s negligence, particularly in light of the Smith Court’s clear
statement that the award is not designed to make the plaintiff whole.
CONCLUSION
We agree that the Burchfield decision brings us to a point at which
reform of lost chance is warranted, especially since the judiciary created
the doctrine, and the legislature has not addressed it. However, we have
fundamental objections to the Morgan Proposal, which calls for an award
of medical expenses to lost chance plaintiffs, not subject to the cap and not
discounted for the plaintiff’s failure to prove causation of those medical
expenses. Such a proposal would inevitably result in a relaxation of the
burden of proof, as plaintiffs would be allowed to recover full or near full
medical malpractice damages, despite having failed to prove causation of
a traditional injury. Such an expansion of the lost chance doctrine in
Louisiana would make the state an outlier nationally. We propose instead
that the legislature adopt a percentage probability approach to valuing lost
chance awards, which would reduce the risk of jury confusion and better
enable appellate review of seemingly excessive awards.
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